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I. Introduction
In Reeves v. Sanderson PlumbingProducts,' the United States Supreme
Court resolved some lingering questions surrounding the role of pretext in a
plaintiff's employment discrimination claim,2 but the federal courts of appeals
continue to disagree over whether trial courts must instructjuries on pretext in
employment discrimination litigation.3 Specifically, a circuit split currently
exists regarding whether a trial court must instruct the jury that it may, but need
not, infer intentional discrimination on the part of the employer if the jury
disbelieves the employer's explanation for the employment decision affecting
the plaintiff.4 The Supreme Court has defined this permissible inference as a
correct statement of law that, if met, sufficiently supports a jury finding for the
plaintiff.5 Unfortunately, the Court has failed to address the question of
1. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). In Reeves, the
Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with a factfinder's
rejection of the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, sufficiently
supported a finding of intentional discrimination. Id. at 140. In this case, the defendant fired a
factory supervisor after forty years of employment. Id. at 137-38. The plaintiff filed suit under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the jury returned a verdict in
his favor. Id. at 138-39. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment based on a
lack of affirmative evidence indicating termination because of age. Id. at 139-40. The Supreme
Court assumed that the McDonnell Douglastripartite formula applied to an ADEA case but did
not address the issue directly. Id. at 142. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had established
a prima facie case by showing that he belonged to a protected class under the ADEA, possessed
qualifications for the position of supervisor, lost his job, and was replaced by younger
individuals. Id. The Court likewise concluded that the defendant had met its burden by
producing the nondiscriminatory explanation that the defendant had fired the plaintiff for failing
to keep adequate attendance records. Id. The Court nevertheless upheld the verdict, stating that
if the jury believes the defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation to be false, it may find for the
plaintiff without additional proof beyond the prima facie case. Id. at 147-48.
2. See id. at 140 (describing a conflict among courts of appeals over the minimum proof
requirements for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases).
3. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting existence of a circuit split over whether to require jury instruction on pretext in Title VII
and related litigation). Issues regarding pretext occasionally arise in cases involving
discrimination outside of the employment arena, such as discriminatory practices inhousing, but
pretext appears most frequently in disputes over discrimination in employment under federal
statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)) and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)).
4. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1236-37 (discussing Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
Model Instruction 5.95, which reads as follows: "You may find that plaintiff's race was a
motivating factor in defendant's decision to demote or discharge plaintiff if it has been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's stated reason(s) for its decisions are not the
true reasons, but are a 'pretext' to hide discriminatory motivation.").
5. See generally Reeves, 530 U.S. 133; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
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whether to mandate a pretext instruction.6 The pretext instruction represents a
unique issue because it describes a permissible inference rather than an
obligatory inference.7
In civil litigation, courts generally follow the rule that a judge need not
instruct the jury on permissible inferences because the average trial contains a
virtually unlimited number of possible inferences that the jury may draw from
any given piece of evidence. 8 A judge's decision to single out a particular
inference in a jury instruction could result in undue emphasis on the issue. 9
Instead, courts typically rely on the arguments of counsel to flesh out
appropriate permissible inferences.' 0
In the context of employment
discrimination litigation, however, the permissible inference described in the
pretext instruction bears particular significance."
Employment discrimination cases generally present complex litigation
problems because they involve sensitive social issues and circumstantial
evidence.12 Employees today enjoy a high degree of protection against racism,
sexism, and other forms of discrimination, but may have difficulty proving such
claims.' 3 Meanwhile, employers often adopt explicit codes of conduct
6. See generally Reeves, 530 U.S. 133; Hicks, 509 U.S. 502.
7. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing the
desirability of leaving the pretext issue to argument of counsel rather than including it in jury
instructions because it embodies a "permissible, but not an obligatory, inference").
8. See id. (stating the basic premise that ajudge "need not deliver instructions describing
all valid legal principles").
9. See Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment DiscriminationCase,
1998 FED. Ors. L. RE v. § 4.27, at www.fclr.org/l 998fedctslrev2.htm ("Singling out a particular
inference for instruction by the judge may give it undue emphasis.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Honorable Gerrilyn G. Brill is the Chief United States
Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Georgia.
10. See Gehring, 43 F.3d at 343 (describing the general judicial preference of leaving
permissible inferences to arguments of counsel).
II. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 (10th Cir.
2002) (Henry, J., concurring) (describing how the permissible inference of pretext plays too
significant a role in employment discrimination litigation to omit it from thejury instructions).
12. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000)
(describing how "'the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and
difficult,' and that '[t]here will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental
processes"' (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)));
see also Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the
general perception that "[i]n numerous cases the courts have recognized that an employee
bringing such a suit faces difficulties in amassing proof because discrimination 'is often subtle"'
(quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987))).
13. See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hardto Win?, 61
LA. L. REv. 555, 558-61 (2001) (discussing statistical evidence indicating that plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases "generally fare worse than most other kinds of civil
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forbidding discrimination in the workplace, but despite such policies,
discrimination often finds ways to survive.' 4 The delicate and complex balance
inherent in employment discrimination litigation therefore requires precise
consideration of all aspects of the case, including the proper format of the jury
instructions. is
In most employment discrimination cases in which issues of pretext arise,
the defendant will provide all sorts of seemingly legitimate reasons to justify its
behavior while the plaintiff will fight to discredit these justifications and prove
6
that the employer acted based on a discriminatory and impermissible motive.'
However, the plaintiff will rarely, if ever, ferret out any sort of"smoking gun"
or affirmative evidence demonstrating discrimination by the employer.' 7 Thus,
creating an inference that the employer lied can give rise to the extremely
important inference that the employer lied for a particular reason: to cover up a
discriminatory purpose.' 8 This simple chain of inferences represents the heart
of the controversy involving the proposed jury instruction.' 9
plaintiffs"). Professor Selmi noted a particularly striking statistic regarding resolution of
employment discrimination disputes in bench trials: "Plaintiffs inemployment cases succeeded
on only 18.7 percent of the cases tried before a judge, whereas the success rates for plaintiffs in
judge-tried insurance cases was 43.6 percent and 41.8 percent for personal injury cases...
success rates [in employment cases] are more than fifty percent below the rate of other claims."
Id. at 560-61.
14. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural

Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 459-460 (2001) (discussing how "[r]acial and gender
inequality persists in many places of employment" despite employers' actions in adopting
"formal policies prohibiting race and sex discrimination and procedures to enforce those
policies").
15. See Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d at 278 ("In the field of employment

discrimination, courts have struggled for decades to develop and refine an evidentiary
framework that fairly balances the interests of the employee who challenges her employer's
conduct as discriminatory and the interests of the employer faced with such a suit.").
16. See, e.g., Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (discussing burden-shifting framework used in
employment discrimination cases). The Court emphasized the importance of giving the plaintiff
in these types of cases the "opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination." Id. at 143 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253
(1981)).
17. See Sturm, supra note 14, at 459-60 ("Smoking guns-the sign on the door that 'Irish
need not apply' or the rejection explained by the comment that 'this is no job for a woman'-are
largely things of the past.").
18. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (describing
the impact of finding that an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is false).
19. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (10th Cir.
2002) (discussing a circuit split over the issue of mandating use of the permissible inference
pretext instruction).
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In addition to the significance of this particular issue, the sheer volume of
employment discrimination cases on the federal docket and the need for
national uniformity in the litigation of these disputes necessitates Supreme
Court resolution of this circuit split. The number of employment discrimination
cases filed in federal court has tripled during the past decade, and
discrimination claims currently comprise approximately ten percent of federal
cases.2 ° These private lawsuits play a vital role in the enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII. 21 If some circuits require a plaintifffriendly instruction while others do not, then forum-shopping seems inevitable,
as trial courts across the country scrutinize
employment decisions for
22
compliance with different federal statutes.
However, three United States courts of appeals have decided to require
this jury instruction in employment discrimination cases involving a proof
pattern described as the McDonnellDouglas tripartite formula.23 The Second,
Third, and Tenth Circuits require the instruction at trial.2 4 Four other U.S.
courts of appeals believe the instruction should not be mandatory.25 Within this
group of four, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have decided not to require
the instruction, while the First and Eighth Circuits have indicated in dicta that
they doubt the necessity of the instruction.2 6 Both positions in the circuit split
have merit.
Employment discrimination cases involve special burden-shifting formulas
explored further in Part IIof this Note, and the unique nature of these cases
may justify a unique jury instruction." Alternatively, this instruction seems to
20. Selmi, supra note 13, at 558; see also Adam Cohen, Too Old to Work?, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 56 (discussing twenty-four percent rise in age-discrimination
complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the previous two
years). In this article, Mr. Cohen stated: "Pick up the paper, and the cases are everywhere." Id.
21. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1,
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3055) (citing
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974)) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
22. See Selmi, supra note 13, at 558 (discussing the rapid increase in employment
discrimination claims since 1990 "due to expansion of important antidiscrimination laws").
23. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241 (indicating that the Tenth Circuit will align itself
with the position of the Second and Third Circuits and require the instruction).
24.

Id.

25. See id. at 1238-39 (acknowledging the position of the First, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits not to mandate use of the instruction).
26. See id. (acknowledging the position of the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits that the instruction constitutes an unnecessary description of a permissible inference).
27. See id. at 1243 (Henry, J., concurring) (describing the unique and important nature of
the permissible inference embodied in the pretext instruction).
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involve nothing more than a common sense conclusion that if the employer lies,
the lie most likely represents an attempt to hide an illegal motive." Singling
out this particular chain of logic in the instruction may distract the jury from the
ultimate question of intentional discrimination, especially if plaintiff's counsel
has repeatedly emphasized the inference ofpretext throughout the course of the
trial. 29 This Note explores the development of the circuit split in the context of
recent Supreme Court opinions and examines the merits of both sides of the
debate.
Ultimately, this Note supports the position of the First, Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits and contends that the decision to issue the instruction
should lie within the discretion of the trial judge.30 Although the pretext
instruction represents a correct statement of law, and the judge may usefully
grant the instruction in many cases, failure to do so does not rise to the level of
reversible error.3 ' Jurors will likely intuitively understand that a false
explanation by the employer probably represents an attempt to conceal a
not all employment discrimination cases
discriminatory motive. 2 In addition,
33
merit an instruction on pretext.
Understanding the debate over the instruction first requires background
knowledge regarding the format of a typical employment discrimination trial.
Therefore, Part I of this Note describes the proof structure the Supreme Court
developed to litigate these types of claims. 4 In outlining the correct proof
28. See Brill, supra note 9, at § 4.27. Judge Brill stated:
[I]t is likely that ajury will understand, without being told by thejudge, that if an
employer is lying about its real reason for its employment actions, it may be trying
to cover up an unlawful reason, and that unlawful reason may be the discriminatory
reason asserted by the plaintiff.
Id. Judge Brill added: "Ajudge need not instruct a jury on something that jurors can glean
from everyday experience and that is likely to be argued by the lawyers." Id.
29. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1248 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Brorby, J., dissenting) (arguing that educating the jury on permissible inferences "can be easily
accomplished by counsel").
30. See id. at 1238-39 (discussing the position of the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits that the instruction constitutes an unnecessary description of a permissible inference).
31. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to find
reversible error on the part of the trial court for failing to grant pretext instruction); see also
Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 789-91 (8th Cir. 200 1) (describing how the
trial court "properly exercised its discretion in declining to submit a pretext instruction").
32. See Brill, supra note 9, at § 4.27 (discussing how jurors will likely understand, on
their own, the possible pretextual significance of a false explanation by the defendant employer).
33. See Moore, 249 F.3d at 790 (stating how the lack of evidence regarding pretext did
not merit a jury instruction on the issue).
34. See infra Part 11(discussing evolution of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite formula).
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structure for these types of cases, the Supreme Court does not address the
question of appropriate jury instructions, but much of the Court's other analysis
provides helpful insight into the debate at the heart of this circuit split. 35 Part

III outlines the development of the circuit split and highlights key portions of
the analysis in each opinion, 36 while Part IV provides an in-depth discussion
and criticism of both positions.37 Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes that
mandating use of this instruction
constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the
38
discretion of the trial court.

I. Development of the McDonnell Douglas Framework
In the past few decades, starting with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,39 the Supreme Court has developed a specific evidentiary fiamework for
litigating issues of discriminatory treatment in employment. 4° In McDonnell
35. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
36. See infra Part Ill (discussing development of circuit split).
37. See infra Part IV (evaluating merits of both sides of circuit split).
38. See infra Part V (concluding that the trial court should retain discretion over
formulation of jury instructions in employment discrimination cases).
39. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas,
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of how to formulate an appropriate burden-shifting proof
structure in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 793-94. The
plaintiff, a black man actively involved in the civil rights movement, worked as a mechanic and
technician for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) from 1956 until MDC fired him in
1964. Id. at 794. In 1965, the plaintiff re-applied for a position as a mechanic, but MDC denied
him re-employment based on his prior participation in disruptive civil rights activities targeting
the employment practices of MDC. Id. at 796. He then filed suit against the corporation. Id. at
797. The trial court dismissed his action, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded.
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to clarify the standards governing the disposition of
an action challenging employment discrimination." Id. at 798. The Court began its analysis by
noting the primary factual conflict between the plaintiff's allegations of racially discriminatory
hiring practices and the defendant's asserted justification that the plaintiff had illegally
participated in certain civil rights activities specifically targeting the corporation. Id; at 801.
The Court then outlined a framework for evaluating these claims. Id. at 802. First, according to
the Court, the plaintiff had the burden to allege a prima facie case of racial discrimination by
demonstrating that he belonged to a protected class, possessed qualifications for an available
job, and was denied employment. Id. The burden of going forward then shifted to the
defendant to provide a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire the plaintiff.
Id. at 802-03. In the third and final step, the plaintiff must receive a fair opportunity to prove
that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory motive represented a pretext for discrimination.
Id. at 804. The Court concluded that the first two parts ofthe framework had been fulfilled and
remanded the case for consideration of the third step. Id. at 807.
40. See id at 802-03 (outlining burden-shifting evidence structure in Title VII litigation).
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Douglas, the Court outlined a tripartite scheme for presentation of evidence in
Title VII litigation. 4 First, the burden rests on the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, which the plaintiff can accomplish by showing, for
example, that he belongs to a protected class, possessed qualifications for an
employment position, and experienced an adverse employment decision, such
as being fired or rejected from an available job.42 Second, after the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant
employer to provide a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.4 3
Third, the plaintiff must receive the opportunity to prove that the defendant
44
employer's explanation constituted a pretext for prohibited discrimination.
Courts have refined and clarified this framework since McDonnell
Douglas, but it has retained its essential tripartite form.45 In the past decade,
legal disputes regarding this framework have centered primarily on the third
part of this test, and federal courts at all levels have wrestled with various
problems involving the issue of pretext and its role in the proof structure.4 6
Two recent Supreme Court cases have ironed out some, but not all, of the
disagreement.4 7
In 1993, the Court issued its opinion in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,48 a five to four decision that attempted to clarify some of the issues

41. See id. at 802-04 (outlining evidentiary framework for Title VII litigation).
42. Id. at 802.
43. Id. at 802-03.
44. Id. at 804.
45. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000)
(outlining tripartite framework established in McDonnell Douglas).
46. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002)
(describing Supreme Court's recent resolution of circuit split over "pretext-plus" theory).
47. See generallyReeves, 530 U.S. 133 (resolving circuit split over "pretext-plus" theory
by holding that factfinder's rejection of employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is sufficient,
without additional evidence beyond the prima facie case, to support finding for plaintiff); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (clarifying McDonnell Douglas tripartite
formula and explaining nature of respective evidentiary burdens on plaintiff and defendant).
48. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). In Hicks, a correctional
facility fired a black man from his job as a supervisor. Id. at 504-05. He sued, arguing that the
facility discharged him because of his race. /d. at 505. After a bench trial, the trial judge found
for the defendant despite concluding that the defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation was
false. Id. at 508. The judge believed the plaintiff had ultimately failed to prove that racial
discrimination represented the true cause of his dismissal. Id. at 508. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that a finding of pretext requires judgment for the
plaintiff as a matter of law. Id. at 508-09. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals,
holding that, even though a finding of pretext would support ajudgment for the plaintiff, it does
not compel such ajudgment. Id. at 509-11.
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surrounding the role of pretext in the McDonnell Douglas framework.49 In
Hicks, the Court considered the basic question of whether a plaintiff deserved
judgment as a matter of law if the trier of fact disbelieved the employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation.5 0 This question focuses primarily on what
pretext means in the context of the tripartite formula.5' The Court first
defined "pretext" in the framework as actually meaning "pretext for
discrimination," a distinction that significantly affected the application of the
entire framework.5 2 The Court then divided "pretext for discrimination" into
two parts. 3 To demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff must have "shown both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. 5 4 However
the Court emphasized the permissibility of inferring the ultimate fact of
discrimination solely from a false explanation by the defendant employer.'5
Although proof of a false explanation by the defendant may therefore help
significantly in proving the employer lied to conceal a discriminatory motive,
and sufficiently supports a judgment
for the plaintiff, it cannot, by itself,
56
compel a finding for the plaintiff.
While Hicks eliminated some of the confusion regarding the application
of pretext to defendants in employment discrimination litigation, a dispute
continued over the role of pretext in the plaintiffs burden of proof.5 7 In
Reeves, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved a circuit split involving the
"pretext-plus" theory. 8 The pretext-plus theory required additional evidence
49. See id. at 504 (explaining grant of certiorari to consider whether the rejection of an
employer's nondiscriminatory explanation by the factfinder compels judgment for the plaintiff).
50.

Id.

51.
52.
53.

See id. at 515-16 (discussing the meaning of pretext in the proof structure).
See id. (describing the difference between "pretext" and "pretext for discrimination").
Id. at 515.

54.

Id.

55. See id. at 511 ("[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons willpermit the trier
of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.").
56. See id. at 517 ("[Plroving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often
considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional
discrimination."). However, the Court also stated:
[Tihe Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons
compelsjudgment for the plaintiffdisregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301
that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated
admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of
persuasion."
Id. at 511.
57. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002)
(describing Supreme Court's recent resolution of a circuit split over the "pretext-plus" theory).
58. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000) (describing
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beyond the prima facie case, rather than a mere rejection of the defendant's
nondiscriminatory explanation, to uphold a verdict for the plaintiff.5 9 This
conclusion ignored the Court's statement in Hicks that a plaintiffs prima
facie case combined with rejection of the defendant's explanation "will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination"
without additional proof. °
The Supreme Court clarified this principle in Reeves by eliminating any
further use of the pretext-plus standard. 61 The Court emphasized the
permissibility of inferring intentional discrimination from a false explanation
by the defendant and added that, in many cases, this inference will constitute
the natural assumption.6 2 Two grounds justify this principle. First, under
evidence law, a trier of fact is "entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about
a material fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt."'' 63 Second, in the
circumstances of an employment dispute, "once the employer's justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth
the actual reason for its decision." 64
Although Reeves firmly established the role of pretext in the overall
McDonnell Douglas framework, the courts of appeals remain divided on the
issue of whether to require jury instructions about pretext. 65 The Supreme
Court should resolve this circuit split before it grows beyond the current four
to three division. Part Hm of this Note explores the development of this
circuit split in the context of opinions handed down both before and after
66
Reeves.

the conflict among the courts of appeals over minimum proof requirements for plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases).
59. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1240-41 (describing the circuit split over the "pretextplus" theory).
60. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) (clarifying the
McDonnell Douglastripartite formula and explaining the nature of the respective evidentiary
burdens on plaintiff and defendant).
61. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47 (describing the impact of finding that an employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation is false).
62. Id. at 147.
63. Id. (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).
64. Id.
65. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1237-40 (10th Cir.
2002) (describing the circuit split).
66. See infra Part III (discussing the evolution of the circuit split).
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III. Background of the CircuitSplit
The circuit split hinges on the necessity of instructing a jury that it may
infer intentional discrimination if it disbelieves a defendant employer's
explanation for its actions.6 s While this instruction contains a correct statement
of the law, courts differ as to its necessity. 68 Although three circuits have
issued opinions mandating use of the instruction, and four have rejected this
requirement, the seven opinions together reflect a certain range in degree of
necessity rather than bright line disagreement. 69 This Part explores the seven
opinions in chronological order, outlining the development of the split relative
to the Supreme Court's decisions in Hicks and Reeves.
A. Post-Hicks and Pre-Reeves CircuitDecisions
One year after the Supreme Court decided Hicks, the Second Circuit
became the first appellate court to mandate use of the pretext instruction.70 In
Cabrerav. Jakabovitz, 71 the Second Circuit addressed the inherent difficulties
67. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237-40 (describing the differences in opinion among the
circuits regarding whether to require this instruction).
68. Id.
69. See id. (discussing the positions of each court of appeals in the circuit split over
pretext instruction).
70. See Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating the requirement
that the trial court must instruct the jury on pretext). The Second Circuit stated in dicta that the
trial judge must instruct the jury on two points:
(1) [l]t is the plaintiff's burden to persuade the jurors by a preponderance of the
evidence that the apartment (orjob) was denied because of race (or, in other cases,
because of some other legally invalid reason), [and] (2) the jury is entitled to infer,
but need not infer, that this burden has been met if they find that the four facts
previously set forth have been established and they disbelieve the defendant's
explanation.
Id.
71. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1994). In Cabrera,the Second Circuit
addressed several issues regarding the proper form ofjury instructions in discrimination cases,
including the role of pretext in such instructions. Id. at 377. The plaintiffs included a nonprofit organization called the Open Housing Center (QHC) and several minority "testers" who
engaged in investigations of landlords and realtors in the New York City area regarding an
illegal form of housing discrimination known as "racial steering." Id. at 377-78. Specifically,
the OHC investigated the operations of AM Realty and two of its landlord clients. ld. at 378.
The investigation spawned a lawsuit against AM Realty and the landlords for housing
discrimination, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. Id. at 379. In its analysis, the
Second Circuit first emphasized the importance of providing the jury with clear and simple
instructions regarding the applicable law, and expressed disfavor towards the use of the
technical legal phrases contained in the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. at 380-81. The
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involved in adapting the complex McDonnell Douglas framework to a set of
comprehensible jury instructions. 72 The court expressly criticized jury
instructions that contain technical legal terminology transposed directly from
the McDonnell Douglas formula because those types of intricate instructions
create a distinct risk of confusing or misleading the jurors.73 In this case, the
jury instructions included phrases such as "prima facie case" and references to
the respective "burdens" borne by plaintiff and defendant.74 While the court
criticized the use of this legal diction, it did not find reversible error by the trial
court for giving the instructions, and emphasized the rule that the jury "must be
told what legal principles
to apply depending on the different ways it might
75
view the evidence.
The Second Circuit used Cabrerato distill two essential principles from
the Supreme Court's decisions in McDonnell Douglas and Hicks.76 In
accordance with its earlier emphasis on simplicity, the court stated the
following:
[T]he jury needs to be told two things: (1) it is the plaintiff's burden to
persuade the jurors by a preponderance of the evidence that the apartment
(or job) was denied because of race (or, in other cases, because of some
other legally invalid reason), [and] (2) the jury is entitled to infer, but need
not infer, that this burden has been met if they find that the four facts
previously set forth have been established and they disbelieve the
defendant's explanation.77
Although the court mandated use of this pretext instruction, it also stated
that "the jury need not be told anything about a defendant's burden of

court specifically rejected the use of terminology such as "prima facie case" or "burden" shifting
in jury instructions but mandated use of the pretext instruction. Id. at 381-82. The court
carefully noted, however, that "[u]nder McDonnell Douglas, the defendant does not bear the
burden of establishing that race was not a factor in his or her decision. Instead, the plaintiff
always bears the ultimate burden of proving discrimination." Id. at 383.
72. See id. at 380-81 (describing the high risk of confusing the jury with intricate
instructions involving the McDonnell Douglas framework).
73. See id. (describing the tendency of lawyers to request, and judges to grant, jury
instructions based on language used by "appellate courts in the context of bench trials," which
may unnecessarily complicate legal issues in the minds ofjurors).
74. See id. at 381 (criticizing use of unfamiliar terms injury instructions that may cause
unnecessary confusion in deliberations).
75.

Id. at 380.

76.

See id. at 382 (summarizing the key elements of the jury's role in these types of

discrimination cases).

77.

Id. (citations omitted).
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production," to avoid the risk ofjurors confusing the burden of production with
the plaintiff's burden of persuasion.78
The rationale for requiring the instruction on pretext in Cabrerastemmed
directly from language the Supreme Court used in Hicks. 9 In fact, the footnote
in the section of Cabrera in which the Second Circuit mandated use of the
pretext instruction cited directly to the following language from Hicks: "The
factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the
'
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. ,80
The Second Circuit apparently interpreted Hicks as providing enough emphasis
on this aspect of the McDonnell Douglas framework to warrant a mandatory
instruction on pretext in discrimination litigation.8 '
The Seventh Circuit did not read Hicks in this manner when addressing
virtually the same issue, however, and declined to require use of the
instruction. 82 In Gehring v. Case Corporation,83 the Seventh Circuit addressed
the question of appropriate jury instructions in an employment discrimination

78. Id. at 381-82.
79. See id. at 382 n.9 (citing explicit language in Hicks that discussed the minimum
standard that can support a finding of intentional discrimination).
80. Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
81. See id. at 382 (requiring an instruction based on the analysis of pretext found in
Hicks).
82. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to find
reversible error when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on pretext in a case arising under
the ADEA).
83. Id. In Gehring, the Seventh Circuit considered the issue of whether the trial court
committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on pretext. Id. at 343. Case
Corporation, the defendant employer, fired the plaintiff, Dale Gehring, during a reduction in its
work force. Id. at 342. Case decided to eliminate three of five cost accountant positions at one
of its Wisconsin plants; management chose Gehring as one of the three. Id. Gehring sued,
alleging that the corporation fired him because of his age and therefore unlawfully discriminated
against him under the ADEA. Id. Gehring was fifty-two years old at the time he lost his job.
Id. Case justified its decision on the grounds that Gehring had developed a poor attitude
towards working at the plant due to an earlier demotion. Id. Thejury believed this explanation
and returned a verdict for Case. Id. Gehring appealed the decision, arguing, in part, that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury "that if it did not believe the employer's
explanation for its decisions, it may infer that the employer is trying to cover up age
discrimination." Id. at 343. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook reasoned that,
while the proposed instruction contained "a correct statement of the law," the trial court did not
err in refusing to include this statement because "a judge need not deliver instructions
describing all valid legal principles." Id. Judge Easterbrook emphasized the lack of necessity
involved when the proposed instruction depicts a permissible inference and stated the
proposition that atrial court "may and usually should" leave such inferences "to the argument of
counsel." Id.
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case arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). s4 In
this case, unlike Cabrera,the plaintiff lost at trial, appealed, and argued that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could infer discrimination if
it did not believe the defendant's explanation."s The Seventh Circuit noted
that, under Hicks, this instruction contains a "correct statement of the law" but
declined the opportunity to mandate use of this principle.86 The court justified
its reasoning with the following statement:
[A] judge need not deliver instructions describing all valid legal principles.
Especially not when the principle in question describes a permissible, but
not an obligatory, inference. Many an inference ispermissible. Rather than
describing each, the judge may and usually should leave the subject to the
argument of counsel. 87

This description of the relationship between permissible inferences and
jury instructions describes the basic position taken by appellate courts that have
declined to require the use of the pretext instruction in discrimination cases. 88
In Gehring,the Seventh Circuit also referred to the lack of harm suffered
by a plaintiff who does not receive this instruction, stating that "Gehring's
lawyer asked the jury to draw this inference; neither judge nor defense counsel
so much as hinted that any legal obstacle stood in the way. Instructions on the
topic were unnecessary."8 9 The court clearly understood the law under Hicks in
the same manner as the Second Circuit in Cabrerayet chose not to require the
instruction." In an interesting parallel to Cabrera, however, the Seventh
Circuit also emphasized the importance of clarity and simplicity in jury
instructions for discrimination claims.9'

84. See id. at 343 (discussing the plaintiff's arguments targeting the trial court's
instructions to the jury).
85.

See id. (discussing Gehring's request that the trial court instruct the jury on pretext).

86. See id. (stating that the discussion of permissible inferences should usually be left to
the argument of counsel).
87.

Id.

88. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (10th Cir.
2002) (summarizing the position of the four circuits that have deemed the instruction
unnecessary).
89. Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994).
90. See id. (citing Hicks for the proposition that a jury may infer discrimination if it
disbelieves the employer's explanation for its decision).
91.

See id. at 344 (describing the importance of avoiding complex terms such as

"determining factor" when instructing a jury on a discrimination claim). Judge Easterbrook
stated that "it is especially important to write instructions that are as clear and simple as
possible. When the legal issue is complex, simplicity of language is vital." Id.
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The Third Circuit weighed in as the next federal court of appeals to
address this issue, and it expressly aligned itself with the position of the Second
Circuit in Cabreramandating use of this instruction.92 In Smith v. Borough of
Wilkinsburg,93 the Third Circuit addressed an issue virtually identical to that
considered by the Seventh Circuit in Gehring yet reached the opposite
conclusion.94 The plaintiff, whose claim arose under the ADEA, argued on
appeal that the trial court had committed reversible error in refusing to instruct
the jury on pretext. 9 The Third Circuit agreed, and described the serious
difficulties plaintiffs face when trying to prove an employment discrimination
claim.96 The court discussed the McDonnell Douglas tripartite formula and
92. See Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,280 (3d Cir. 1998) (joining the
Second Circuit in requiring the instruction). The Third Circuit stated its decision in the
following terms:
[We] join the Second Circuit in holding that the jurors must be instructed that they
are entitled to infer, but need not, that the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
demonstrating intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence can be
met if they find that the facts needed to make up the prima facie case have been
established and they disbelieve the employer's explanation for its decision.
Id.
93. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998). In this case, the
Borough Council failed to renew the employment contract of Edward C. Smith for the position
of Manager of the Borough of Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania but invited him to reapply for the job.
Id. at 275. Smith, who was sixty-one years old, indicated his desire to retain the position, but he
did not submit an application in writing until after the Council hired anew, thirty-seven year old
manager. Id. Smith sued the Borough, alleging that he had not been re-hired because of his age
in violation of the ADEA, and at trial adduced evidence indicating improved fiscal status of the
Borough during his employment. Id. The Borough countered with testimony of inadequate job
performance by Smith. Id. The trial court rejected Smith's proposed instruction on pretext, and
the jury returned a verdict for the Borough. Id. Smith appealed on the sole ground that the trial
court had erred in refusing to give this instruction. Id. The Third Circuit agreed. Id. at 28 1. In
its reasoning, the Third Circuit emphasized "the pivotal role played by pretext in the ultimate
decision of discrimination vel non" and expressly adopted the position of the Second Circuit
articulated in Cabrera. Id. at 279-80. The court vacated the jury verdict and remanded the case
fora new trial. Id. at 281.
94. See id. at 274 (describing the plaintiff's argument on appeal that the trial court
committed reversible error by refusing "to instruct the jury that it could infer intentional
discrimination if it disbelieved the Borough's asserted reasons for not renewing Smith's
contract").
95. Id. at 275.
96. See id. at 278 (describing the complexity of discrimination claims and the enormous
obstacles blocking plaintiffs seeking to prevail in these claims). The court included plaintifffriendly language in its background description, stating: "Discrimination victims often come to
the legal process without witnesses and with little direct evidence indicating the precise nature
of the wrongs they have suffered." Id. (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100
F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d
230, 236 (3d Cir. 1987))).
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focused, in particular, on "the pivotal role played by pretext in the ultimate
decision of discrimination," concluding that the focus of a trial conducted under
this formula will invariably be the truthfulness ofthe defendant's explanation. 97
Upon reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit explicitly stated that it joined
the Second Circuit in requiring the jury instruction on pretext. 98 Justification
for this position came primarily from concern that all of the federal judiciary's
"carefully honed language will have been an exercise in irrelevance" if the jury
does not receive clear instructions regarding permissible inferences based on
pretext. 99
The Eleventh Circuit considered this issue in the intervening month
between oral argument in Reeves and the Supreme Court's decision in that
case. 1°° In Palmerv. BoardofRegents,'0 ' the Eleventh Circuit considered the
question of whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice because of the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on pretext. 1 2 Striking an interesting
97. Id. at 278-79.
98. See id. at 280 (aligning itself with the position taken by the Second Circuit). The
court explained its position by stating:
We join the Second Circuit in holding that the jurors must be instructed that they
are entitled to infer, but need not, that the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
demonstrating intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence can be
met if they find that the facts needed to make up the prima facie case have been
established and they disbelieve the employer's explanation for its decision.
Id.
99.

Id.

100. See Palmer v. Bd. of Regents, 208 F.3d 969,975 (11 th Cir. 2000) (declining to find
reversible error in an employment discrimination case when the trial court failed to instruct the
jury on pretext).
101. Palmer v. Bd. of Regents, 208 F.3d 969 (11 th Cir. 2000). In Palmer,the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a trial court committed reversible error in failing to
provide the jury with a proposed instruction on pretext. Id. at 972-73. Judy Palmer, an
assistant professor at Kennesaw State University, applied for two different permanent positions
at the university during the 1994-95 academic year. Id. at 971. The university chose her as a
finalist for both positions but, in each case, hired a different applicant. Id. at 971-72. Palmer
sued, alleging that the university failed to select her because she was Jewish. Id. at 972. The
trial court rejected Palmer's proposed jury instruction on pretext, the jury returned a verdict for
the university, and Palmer appealed. Id. at 972-73. The Eleventh Circuit discussed the
important role of pretext in the McDonnell Douglasformula and cited both the Second Circuit's
opinion in Cabrera and the Third Circuit's opinion in Borough of Wilkinsburg with approval,
but ultimately found a lack of error by the trial court. Id. at 974-75. The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that a consideration of the jury instructions as a whole revealed no prejudice to the
plaintiff. Id. at 975. The Eleventh Circuit concluded by suggesting that the Committee on
Panem Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit "revisit the
pattern jury instruction on this issue to consider whether any improvements in clarity might be
warranted." Id.
102. See id. at 975 (discussing Palmer's proposed instruction at trial and the appellate
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compromise on the issue, the Eleventh Circuit cited both the Second Circuit's
decision in Cabrera and the Third Circuit's decision in Borough of
Wilkinsburg with approval, yet ultimately decided that the trial court had not
erred in refusing to give the instruction.'0 ' The court noted the important role
of pretext in a discrimination case litigated under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, but upon consideration of the jury instructions as a whole, the court
found the missing pretext language non-prejudicial to the plaintiff. 04 However,
the court ended its opinion by suggesting that the Committee on Pattern Jury
Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit examine
the issue to decide whether "any improvements in clarity might be
warranted."'0 5
B. Post-Reeves Circuit Decisions
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves, the circuits had
already split two versus two regarding the necessity of this instruction, yet the
Court did not mention the issue in its analysis. 10 6 Nor did Reeves end the
controversy, which has continued to develop along relatively even lines.'0 7 In
Reeves, the Court examined the appropriateness of entering judgment as a
matter of law for an employer despite a jury verdict for the employee.'0 ° The
instructions the trial court gave did not incite controversy in this case, and a
detailed analysis of their content would have constituted mere dicta.'°9 While
Reeves provided additional clarity regarding the role of pretext in claims arising
standard of review when examining jury instructions).
at 974-75 (citing excerpts from Second and Third Circuit opinions, including
103. See id.
is difficult to understand what
the Third Circuit's statement in Borough of Wilkinsburgthat "[i]t
end is served by reversing the grant of summaryjudgment for the employer on the ground that
the jury is entitled to infer discrimination from pretext... if the jurors are never informed that
they may do so" (quoting Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,279 (3d Cir. 1998))).
104. See id. (agreeing that an instruction on the permissible inference of discrimination
based on disbelief of the employer's explanation represents a correct statement of law but
finding sufficient fairness in the challenged jury instructions as a whole).
105. Id. at 975.
106. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
(analyzing an employment discrimination case under the McDonnell Douglas formula without
commenting on the circuit split or the necessity of including the instruction).
107. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (10th Cir.
2002) (summarizing the development of the circuit split).
108. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 139-40 (examining a decision by the Fifth Circuit to enter
judgment against an employee despite a jury verdict to the contrary).
109. Id.
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under federal discrimination law, the federal courts of appeals have continued
to disagree on the necessity of an instruction on pretext." 0 This ongoing
conflict reflects, in part, the proposition that Reeves may provide a plausible
reading in support of either side of the circuit split, a possibility explored
further in Part IV of this Note."' However, the dual support provided by
Reeves indicates the need for additional clarity from the Supreme Court on this
matter.
The next two circuits to touch on the issue of pretext in jury instructions
for discrimination cases did not formally address whether the instruction
warranted mandatory use, but both courts expressed doubt regarding its
necessity. 12 In Fite v. Digital Equipment Corp.," the First Circuit briefly
addressed the plaintiff's claim of error regarding the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on pretext." 4 The court opined that "[w]hile permitted, we
doubt that such an explanation is compulsory, even if properly requested" but
I10. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237-40 (discussing positions taken by each U.S. Court of
Appeals in the circuit split over jury instructions on pretext).
Ill. See infra Pan IV (evaluating the merits of both sides of the circuit split).
112. See Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 7 (1 st Cir. 2000) (expressing "doubt that
such an explanation is compulsory" but declining to rule on the issue for procedural reasons);
see also Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 790 n.9 (8th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing the circuit split on the pretext issue and stating that "[w]e do not express any view
as to whether it ever would be reversible error for a trial court to fail to give a pretext
instruction, though we tend to doubt it").
113. Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2000). In File, the First Circuit
reviewed the trial court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's Massachusetts discrimination claims
as well as the trial court's choice of jury instructions regarding the plaintiff's federal
discrimination claims. Id. at 6-7. Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) employed plaintiff
David Fite for twenty years before firing him in 1994 after an eight-year decline in his job
performance. Id. at 4. Beginning in 1991, Fite filed at least two complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that DEC had discriminated against
him because of his age (fifty-three in 1991) and disability (cocaine addiction) through DEC's
failure to consider him for other job openings. Id. at 5. In support of his complaints, Fite
provided his attorney with two incriminating emails by DEC management. Id. DEC, upon
notice by the EEOC, determined that Fite had fabricated the emails and fired him based on the
forgery. Id. Fite then sued DEC for discrimination based on his age and disability. Id. The
trial court dismissed his state-law discrimination claims and the jury found for DEC regarding
Fite's federal discrimination claims. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit reasoned that, because the
applicable Massachusetts state law mirrored federal discrimination law, the dismissal of the
state-law claims, even if erroneous, constituted harmless error because of the jury finding for
DEC under the federal claims. Id. at 6. The court addressed Fite's claims of error in the jury
instructions only in passing because of Fite's failure to properly preserve these claims at trial.
Id. at 7.
114. See id. at 7 (mentioning, but declining to rule upon, plaintiff's argument that "thejury
should have been told affirmatively that aprimafaciecase, coupled with a finding of pretext,
would permit the jury to infer discrimination").
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declined to rule on the issue because of the plaintiff's failure to preserve the
claim at trial." 5
In Moore v. Robertson FireProtection District,116 the plaintiff properly
preserved the claim of error, but the Eighth Circuit refused to find an abuse of
discretion by the trial court for failing to instruct the jury on pretext.' '7 The
court based its reasoning on two primary factors. First, a lack of a factual
dispute regarding pretext during the trial indicated that the district court
"properly exercised its discretion in declining to submit a pretext
instruction."" 8 Second, plaintiffs counsel had argued thoroughly during both
opening and closing statements that "the explanations given by the Fire District
were a pretext for race discrimination."' '9 In addition, the court stated that
"[w]e do not express any view as to whether it ever would be reversible error
for a trial court to fail to give a pretext instruction, though we tend to doubt
it." 2 The Eighth Circuit noted the existence of the circuit split on this issue,
there are any
however, and conservatively left open the question of '"whether
2
circumstances that would require such an instruction.' '

115. Id.
116. Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2001). In Moore, the
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error in
refusing to give a jury instruction on pretext. Id. at 788-89. in 1998, the Robertson Fire
Protection District (RFPD) placed a help-wanted advertisement to seek applicants for a vacant
fire chief position. Id. at 788. The RFPD interviewed several of the applicants but did not
select Moore for an interview. Id. After Moore discovered that the RFPD had ultimately hired
a white male "who did not meet many of the requirements placed in the ad," he filed suit against
the RFPD, alleging racial discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 787-88. At trial, the jury found
for the RFPD, and Moore appealed thejudgment. Id. at 787. On appeal, Moore argued that the
trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on pretext "impermissibly prevented the jury from
considering whether the Fire District's reasons for not interviewing and hiring him were a
pretext for race discrimination." Id. at 789. The Eighth Circuit first noted that "Moore
introduced scant evidence of pretext" during the trial. Id. at 790. The court reasoned that the
lack of a factual question regarding pretext supported the conclusion that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in refusing to grant the instruction. Id. The Eighth Circuit also noted that
"although the District Court elected not to submit a pretext instruction, it in no way prevented
Moore from presenting his pretext arguments to the jury," and according to the record, Moore in
fact did make this argument several times during the trial. Id. at 79 1.
117. See id.
at 790 ("Given the state of the evidence, which provides little to create a fact
issue on pretext, the District Court properly exercised its discretion in declining to submit a
pretext instruction.").
118. Id.
119. Id.at 791.
120. See id. at 790 n.9 (reserving judgment on whether circumstances exist that would
warrant the mandatory use of the pretext instruction).
121. Id.
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C. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.

In Townsend v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 22 the Tenth Circuit
squarely addressed the growing circuit split, provided the most recent and indepth analysis of the issue, and decided to mandate use of the instruction in a
sharply split decision. 123 Townsend involved an African-American man who
sued his former employer for rapidly demoting and then firing him after a
decade-long employment relationship. 24 The litigation focused primarily on
the issue of whether the defendant insurance company provided a truthful
reason for firing Townsend, because he presented impeachment evidence that
questioned the veracity of the defendant's explanation.' 2 Despite the question
of fact surrounding this evidence, the trial court refused to grant Townsend's
request to instruct the jury that "if it did not believe Kemper's explanation, it
could take this as evidence that Kemper's true motive for terminating him was
discriminatory and could on this basis conclude-though it need not do so-that Kemper terminated Townsend for a discriminatory reason."'' 26 On appeal,

122. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). In
Townsend, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible
error by failing to instruct the jury that it could infer discrimination if it disbelieved the
defendant employer's explanation. Id. at 1236. The plaintiff, Townsend, worked for
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (LMCC) from 1986 until 1997. Id. at 1234-36. In his
final year with LMCC, however, Townsend's relationship with the company soured. Id. In
February of 1997, LMCC presented Townsend with the options of resignation or demotion
based on his allegedly deficient performance as a "personal lines unit manager." Id. at 1235.
Townsend chose demotion to a non-management position. Id. Townsend's supervisor
terminated him in November of 1997 and Townsend filed suit against LMCC, alleging racial
discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 1236. At trial, the parties disputed the motives behind
Townsend's termination, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict for LMCC. Id. at 1233. On
appeal, Townsend argued for a new trial based primarily on the trial court's failure to provide
the jury with his requested instruction on pretext. Id. at 1236. After citing and discussing each
opinion in the circuit split, the Tenth Circuit decided to mandate use of the instruction. Id. at
1241. The court based its analysis on the reasoning the Second and Third Circuits provided in
Cabrera and Borough of Wilkinsburg and ultimately found most persuasive the Supreme
Court's emphasis on the pretext standard in Reeves. Id. at 1237-40. Senior Circuit Judge
Brorby dissented, however, stating that arguments of counsel provided extensive coverage of the
pretext principle and therefore rendered a jury instruction on the subject unnecessary. Id. at
1244-48 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 1241 (mandating the use of the instruction).
124. See id. at 1234-36 (summarizing the factual background of the dispute).
125. See id. at 1235-36 (discussing the admission of a false statement by an LMCC
employee and testimony by an LMCC employee indicating that the company created an artificial
reason to justify Townsend's termination).
126. Id. at 1236.

PRETEXT IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA TION LITIGA TION

427

Townsend argued primarily 7that this failure to instruct the jury on pretext
constituted reversible error.12
The Tenth Circuit provided a detailed analysis of this argument, starting
with an examination of the existing circuit split on this issue. 128 The court cited
the Second and Third Circuits' opinions in Cabrera and Borough of
Wilkinsburg extensively and with approval, but noted the different points of
Circuits. 29
view expressed by the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Ultimately, however, "and perhaps most significantly," the Tenth Circuit noted
that "the Supreme Court in Hicks and Reeves cleared away a circuit split over
the so-called 'pretext-plus' theory which said that a jury's rejection of an
employer's proffered explanation could not, by itself, suffice to show
discriminatory motive."' 30 The court indicated that two Supreme Court
opinions had attempted to iron out the difficulties that federal courts have
experienced in grappling with these issues, and concluded:
This is a difficult matter for courts, and would certainly be difficult for a
jury. We consider the danger too great that a jury might make the same
assumption that the Fifth Circuit did in Reeves. Therefore, we hold that in
cases such as this, a trial court must instruct jurors that if they disbelieve an
employer's proffered explanation they may-but need not-infer that the
employer's true motive was discriminatory. 131
The Tenth Circuit, however, seemed to leave itself some wiggle room by
adding the following:
We do not hold that a pretext instruction is always required, but rather that
it is required where, as here, a rational finder of fact could reasonably find
the defendant's explanation false and could "infer from the falsity of the
explanation32that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose." 1

127. See id. ("Townsend first contends that it was reversible error for the district court not
to instruct the jury that it could infer intentional discrimination if it found that Kemper's
explanation was pretextual.").
128. See id. at 1237-39 (considering each opinion that other circuits have published
addressing the issue of requiring jury instructions on pretext in discrimination litigation).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1240.
131. Id. at 1241.
132. See id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134
(2000)). The court also quoted Reeves as "suggesting that there may be situations in which 'no
rational factfinder could conclude that discrimination had occurred' but declining to 'resolve all
such circumstances."' Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 134-35).
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This caveat relied on language the Supreme Court used in Reeves to
outline circumstances that could entitle a defendant employer to judgment as a
matter of law. The Tenth Circuit effectively imported this language for use as a
standard in determining when failure to give a requested jury instruction on
pretext would constitute reversible error. 133 As a practical matter, this
transposition seems to result in the following rule: If the employer is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court must instruct the jury on
pretext. Or, even more simply, if the case goes to the jury, so must the
instruction. Rather than leave room for argument, therefore, this rule seems to
remove all discretion from the hands of the trial judge regarding the jury
instruction on pretext when the employer does not receive judgment as a matter
of law. The Tenth Circuit then applied its new standard to the facts of the case
before it and determined that, because of "a sharp conflict in the evidence"
regarding the defendant employer's motive, "the jury needed guidance by the
requested pretext instruction."' 134 Accordingly, the court reversed thejudgment
and awarded Townsend a new trial.'35
Senior Judge Brorby dissented.1 6 He agreed that the pretext standard
represented a correct statement of the law, but argued that the district court did
not commit reversible error in failing to instruct on the issue.3 7 He based this
argument primarily on the distinction between obligatory and permissible
inferences. 38 In a given trial, he stated, the limited number of possible
obligatory inferences and their inherent "clear-cut" nature create "little danger"
of "unfair bias in favor of the party requesting the instruction.' 39 Permissible
inferences, on the other hand, "are not clear-cut" and could dilute or cloud jury
instructions because of the unlimited number of permissible inferences in a
given trial.' 40 He concluded that the plaintiffs counsel had argued on pretext

133.

CompareReeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49 (discussing factors and circumstances that could

lead to judgment as a matter of law for a defendant employer), with Townsend v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing circumstances in which the

standard outlined in Reeves requires reversal of an erroneous jury instruction).
134.
135.

Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1242.
Id. at 1243.

136. Id. at 1244 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Brorby, J., dissenting).
138. See id. (Brorby, J., dissenting) ("When, as here, the requested instruction concerns
permissible rather than obligatory inferences to be drawn from the evidence, Isee little need for
a jury instruction.").
139.
140.

Id. at 1245-46 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brorby, J., dissenting).
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throughout the trial and therefore
little danger existed regarding juror confusion
4
or ignorance of the law.1 '
IV. Reconciliation of the CircuitSplit
As the preceding discussion of decisions by the courts of appeals has
indicated, strong arguments support both sides of the circuit split. 41 On the
one hand, the pretext question probably represents the most important issue in
many employment discrimination cases, and therefore the court should instruct
the jury on the applicable standard of law regarding this issue.' 43 Alternatively,
if the jury believes that the defendant employer has provided a false explanation
for its actions, the jury will likely infer on its own that the employer has lied to
cover up a discriminatory purpose,'" especially if plaintiffs counsel has
hammered upon this argument. 45 In that case, the instruction seems
unnecessary. This Note examines the merits of these arguments in the
following two subparts, beginning with the argument in support of mandating
the instruction on pretext.
A. Argumentfor Mandatingthe PretextInstruction
The argument for mandating the description of this inference in jury
instructions proceeds in three logical steps. First, "it is a principle of evidence
law that the jury is entitled to treat a party's dishonesty about a material fact as
evidence of culpability."' 46 Second, the Supreme Court has developed this
"comnonsense principle" 47 into a particular permissible inference that
141. Id. at 1246-48 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
142. See supra Part III (discussing the development of the circuit split).
143. See Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,279 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing
the "pivotal role played by pretext in the ultimate decision of discrimination vel non" in an
opinion that mandated use of the jury instruction on pretext).
144. See Brill, supra note 9, at § 4.27 ("[I]t is'likely that a jury will understand, without
being told by the judge, that if an employer is lying about its real reason for its employment
actions, it may be trying to cover up an unlawful reason, and that unlawful reason may be the
discriminatory reason asserted by the plaintiff.").
145. See id. ("A judge need not instruct a jury on something that jurors can glean from
everyday experience and that is likely to be argued by the lawyers." (citing Gehring v. Case
Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994))).
146. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 154 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
147. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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represents a vital part of the McDonnell Douglas framework used to litigate
employment discrimination disputes.'4 Finally, as Judge Henry noted in his
concurrence to Townsend, "while ... it cannot be true that a district court need
instruct on every permissive inference available to a jury-the instruction here
describes a particular
permissive inference that many jurors might otherwise
49
improper."
assume
The general standard for instructing a jury may provide useful guidance
for developing this argument further. In considering whether to mandate use of
a pretext instruction in employment discrimination cases, the Third Circuit
began by stating:
It is black letter law that "[i]t is the inescapable duty of the trial judge to
instruct the jurors, fully and correctly, on the applicable law of the case,
and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an intelligent understanding of
the legal and factual issues involved in their search for the truth."' 0
This statement also reflects the typical standard of review the courts of
appeals use in examining jury instructions:
To determine whether the jury was adequately instructed on the applicable
law, we review the instructions in their entirety de novo to determine
whether the jury was misled in any way. The instructions as a whole need
not be flawless, but we must be satisfied that, upon hearing the instructions,
the jury understood the issues to be resolved and its duty to resolve them.'5 '
Generally, however, "[r]eversal is only warranted if the failure to give the
instruction resulted in prejudicial harm to the requesting party.' 52
Therefore, in order for the jury instruction on pretext to warrant mandatory
use in employment discrimination trials, the pretext question must, at a
minimum, represent a correct statement of the law and, in addition, omission of
the instruction must result in prejudicial error to the plaintiff.'53 Conducting
148. See id. at 147 ("[O]nce the employer's justification has been eliminated,
discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.").
149. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Henry, J., concurring).
150. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 9A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2556, at 438 (2d
ed. 1995)).
151. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545,
552 (10th Cir. 1999) and Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998)).
152. Palmer v. Bd. of Regents, 208 F.3d 969, 973 (11 th Cir. 2000) (citing Roberts &
Schaefer Co. v. Hardaway Co., 152 F.3d 1283, 1295 (11 th Cir. 1998)).
153. Id.
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this analysis in the abstract without specific facts to use for guidance seems
difficult. Thus, an examination of Hicks and Reeves may yet again prove
helpful.
The emphasis on the pretext question in Hicks and Reeves presents the
strongest support for requiring the pretext instruction.1 4 These two Supreme
Court opinions have clearly established the proposition that pretext does not
represent merely one random permissible inference in an employment
discrimination case, but instead constitutes a specific and highly likely
permissible inference that generally plays a central role in determining the
Furthermore, if a question of fact exists
outcome of this type of case.'
regarding pretext, then the trial court may not grant the employer judgment as a
matter of law.' 56 Although the Supreme Court has not examined the proper
relationship between pretext and jury instructions, one could logically conclude
that a court must include pretext in any statement to the jury regarding the
correct application of law in an employment discrimination case.7
Reeves, as both a unanimous decision and the most recent Supreme Court
opinion in the area of employment discrimination, represents the best source for
determining the correct weight a court should give the issue of pretext in the
resolution of an employment discrimination dispute.' 58 The role of pretext in
the applicable law will help determine the possibility of prejudice to a plaintiff
who fails to receive an instruction on the issue. In Reeves, the Supreme Court
made several important points regarding the relationship between pretext and
the plaintiff's case of intentional discrimination. First, the Court noted that,
throughout the case and after the framework disappears, "[t]he ultimate burden
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated

154. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
155. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (discussing the role of pretext as perhaps the most
persuasive form of circumstantial evidence in employment discrimination cases); Hicks, 509
U.S. at 517 (describing how pretext "often considerably assists" proving intentional
discrimination).
156. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153-54 (reversing a judgment as a matter of law for the
defendant employer because sufficient evidence of pretext existed to support a finding of
intentional discrimination).
157. See, e.g., Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir.
2002) (reasoning that pretext constitutes a vital issue in employment discrimination cases and
must be described injury instructions).
158. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 137 (resolving the issue of "whether a defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case consists exclusively of a prima facie case
of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action").
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against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."' 159 The Court
described this burden of persuasion in language that initially seems to require
more than a showing of pretext by the plaintiff: "It is not enough ... to
disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation
of intentional discrimination."' 6 0 The Court, however, went on to elaborate
upon the method by which a plaintiff may use pretext to convince the jury of
intentional discrimination. 61 While a finding of untruthfulness by the
defendant employer does not compel judgment for the plaintiff,162 the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that "it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact' 63 of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's
explanation."'
In addition, the Court described this particular inference as representing
not only a permissible conclusion but a highly probable one. 64 The Court
stated:
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive ....Moreover, once the
employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be
the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in
65
the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.1
The probability that a false explanation by the defendant employer means
166
the employer "is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose,"
combined with the vital role pretext plays in employment discrimination cases,
seems to elevate this particular inference to a status somewhere above the given

159. See id. at 143 (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)).
160. See id. at 147 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993)).
161. See id. at 147-48 (discussing the practical and probable link between pretext and
intentional discrimination).
162. See, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524 ("That the employer's proffered reason is
unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's
proffered reason of race is correct.").
163. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
164. See id. at 148 ("[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we generally assume acts with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration." (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978))).
165. Id. at 147.
166. Id.
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multitude of permissible inferences present in an average trial.'6 7 Perhaps the
unique nature of this inference warrants unique treatment in jury instructions.
This final step in the proof process represents the crux of the argument to
mandate use of the pretext instruction. This step relies on the assumption that,
in the absence of the instruction, a jury might not understand the legality of
finding for the plaintiff based solely on the falsity of the defendant's
explanation. 168 In other words, unless the court gives the instruction, "a jury
might make the same assumption that the Fifth Circuit did in Reeves" and
assume that the plaintiff must provide additional affirmative evidence beyond a
showing of pretext in order to prevail. 69 The concern that the jury could
misunderstand the law governing employment discrimination seems logical,
especially after examining a sample instruction that lacks any reference to
pretext, such as the one given by the district court in Townsend:
In order for plaintiff to recover on [his Title VII] claim, he must prove by
the preponderance of the evidence that defendant intentionally
discriminated against plaintiff, that is, plaintiffs race must be proven to
have been a70motivating factor in defendant's decision regarding plaintiffs
demotion.
It seems entirely plausible, if not probable, that "a rational juror might very
well have interpreted such an instruction to require affirmative proof of
discriminatory intent."' 7' Omission of the pretext instruction therefore creates
the possibility that ajury could find for the defendant "because it believe[s] that
the plaintiff could not prevail without affirmative evidence that his race was a
motivating factor in the challenged employment actions."'172 The risk of this
may
erroneous interpretation, which would clearly prejudice the plaintiff,
73
justify mandating use of the instruction as a prophylactic measure.1
167. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("(A] judge need not
deliver instructions describing all valid legal principles. Especially not when the principle in
question describes a permissible, but not an obligatory, inference. Many an inference is
permissible.").
168. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Henry, J., concurring) (discussing the possibility that ajury might assume a plaintiff"could not
prevail for having failed to offer any credible evidence directly suggesting a discriminatory
animus").
169. Id. at 1241.
170. Id. at 1243 (Henry, J., concurring).
171. Id. (Henry, J., concurring).
172. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 10,
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3055) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See id. at 11-19 (arguing that trial courts must instruct juries on pretext to prevent
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One should not read the rationale behind requiring the pretext instruction
as revealing a lack of faith in the ability ofjurors, however. While the heart of
this permissible inference contains the "common sense notion" that an
employer who lies about motivation likely lies to cover up an illegal motive, a
logical step beyond common sense seems necessary to reach the legal premise
that this inference alone may support a finding for the plaintiff.174 In fact, the
Supreme Court addressed pretext twice in the past decade in order to sort out
disputes among the courts of appeals regarding the issue. 175 That jurors may
need a bit of clarification on the issue in their instructions does not seem
unreasonable.
As one commentator recently indicated, the difficulty inherent in resolving
employment discrimination cases stems from the impossibility of defining
"intentional discrimination."' 176 Both Hicks and Reeves assert that "[t]he
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
77
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."'

Neither case, however, provides a specific definition of the elusive concept of
intentional discrimination, but instead each case presents analysis of one
particular means by which a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination:
pretext.178 This reading ofHicks and Reeves provides additional support to the
erroneous interpretation of federal employment discrimination law).
174. See Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 1998) (suggesting
jurors will not know that pretext is enough to support a finding for the plaintiff). The court
explained:

Although the inference of discrimination arising from pretext is grounded in the
common sense notion that any party's false testimony may be taken as evidence of
its having fabricated its case, this does not mean that the jury will know without
being told that its disbelief in the employer's proffered reason may be evidence
that, coupled with evidence establishing plaintiff's prima facie case, will support a

finding of intentional discrimination .... If it is to be assumed that jurors have

ordinary intelligence, it may not be assumed that they are students of the law.

Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
175.

See id. (discussing how "the answer to the question of whether ajury is allowed to

infer discrimination from pretext eluded many of the federal courts of this country for a
substantial period of time").
176. See John Valery White, The IrrationalTurn in Employment DiscriminationLaw:
Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709, 749
(2002) ("[E]veryone speaks vaguely about what intentional discrimination is supposed to be.
There is areason for this; the concept is undefinable because no one really knows how to define

the underlying categories.").
177. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993) (same).
178. See White, supra note 176, at 757 ("The hoopla about pretext is only a vehicle for the
Court to emphasize the substantive approach to proving discrimination and for obscuring the
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argument that a jury must receive an instruction on pretext rather than an
instruction limited to the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has proven
intentional discrimination. 7 9 At the very least, an instruction on pretext
provides the jury with some concrete method to define "intentional
discrimination" in a legal context and should help corral unfounded speculation
regarding the correct legal standard.8 0 Without the instruction, jurors, like so
many federal courts, may conclude that a plaintiff cannot prevail based on
pretext alone.'81
B. Argument for Leaving the Pretext Instruction to the Discretion
of the TrialJudge
The argument against requiring the pretext instruction proceeds in two
basic steps. First, the argument begins with the principle that a judge need not
instruct the jury on permissible inferences.'1 2 Second, the argument proceeds
with an attack on the merits of the argument for mandating its use and
demonstrates a lack of compelling reasons for this special treatment. Upon
discrediting these reasons, the general premise that a judge need not instruct the
jury on permissible inferences continues to apply.8 3 Because the pretext
instruction consists of a correct statement of applicable law, it may be
appropriate in many circumstances, but the decision of whether to include it
seems best left to the discretion of the trial judge. 8 4 In addition, by mandating
absence of a definition thereof.").
179. See Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d at 280 ("If the district courts are not required to
instruct the jurors that they may use ...their rejection of the reasons offered by the employer
for the employment decision to conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated, then all
our carefully honed language will have been an exercise in irrelevance.").
180. See id.("Without a charge on pretext, the course of the jury's deliberations will
depend on whether the jurors are smart enough or intuitive enough to realize that inferences of
discrimination may be drawn from... the pretextual nature of the employer's proffered reasons
for its actions."). The court added: "It does not denigrate the intelligence of our jurors to
suggest that they need some instruction in the permissibility of drawing that inference." Id.
181. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002)
(mandating the use of the pretext instruction to avoid the risk thatjurors would reach the same
erroneous conclusion as federal courts regarding the correct role of pretext in employment
discrimination litigation).
182. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Many an inference is
permissible. Rather than describing each, the judge may and usually should leave the subject to
the argument of counsel.").
183. Id.
184. See id. ("This is a correct statement of the law, but a judge need not deliver
instructions describing all valid legal principles." (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
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use of the pretext instruction, courts risk placing undue emphasis on this
inference at the expense of the numerous other permissible inferences possible
in an employment discrimination dispute. 83 The argument against mandating
use of the pretext instruction thus begins with the premise that instructions on
permissible inferences ordinarily fall within the discretion of the trial court and,
absent a strong showing of necessity or possible prejudice, the trial court
should
1 86
retain its "broad discretion in the formulation ofjury instructions.
The core of the argument for mandating the pretext instruction relies on
the assumption that, in the absence of the instruction, the plaintiff will suffer
prejudice because the jury will fail to understand the legality of inferring
intentional discrimination from disbelief of the employer's explanation.8 7 As
discussed in Part IV.A, courts have derived support for this assumption from
two primary sources.'8 8 First, the Supreme Court's analysis in Reeves and
Hicks places enormous emphasis on the pivotal role played by pretext in
employment discrimination litigation." 9 Second, courts have expressed anxiety
that a jury may not realize its legal entitlement to infer discrimination from
pretext without an explicit instruction on the matter. 190 In support of this
second premise, courts have noted the considerable difficulties federal judges
experienced during the past several decades in trying to discern the correct role
of pretext in these cases.' 9'
U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
185. See Brill, supra note 9, at § 4.27 ("Singling out a particular inference for instruction
by the judge may give it undue emphasis.").

186. Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2000) ("It is well
established that district courts are entrusted with broad discretion in the formulation of jury
instructions."). In this case, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "the District Court did not abuse
its broad discretion by declining to give an instruction on pretext" because the plaintiff had
introduced only "scant evidence" on the pretext issue. Id. at 789-90.
187. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that ajury
will remain unaware of the correct legal standard inemployment discrimination litigation in the
absence of an instruction on pretext).
188. See supra Part IV.A (arguing for mandatory use of the pretext instruction).
189. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000);
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502.
190. See Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,280 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
although pretext is "grounded in the common sense notion that any party's false testimony may
be taken as evidence of its having fabricated its case, this does not mean that the jury will know
without being told that its disbelief... will support a finding of intentional discrimination")
(citing Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir. 1996) (en

banc)).
19 1. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (10th Cir.
2002) (discussing how two Supreme Court opinions were necessary to iron out the disagreement
among the federal courts regarding the correct role of pretext in employment discrimination
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These arguments for mandating the instruction have distinct weaknesses.
In response to the first premise, Hicks and Reeves arguably support a reading
against mandating use of the instruction despite extensive analysis in both cases
on the issue of pretext.192 Although Hicks involved a bench trial, the Court
repeatedly emphasized a point that weighs heavily on this discussion: "The
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."' 93
Similarly, in Reeves, the Court stated that "[t]he ultimate question is whether
the employer intentionally discriminated, and proof that 'the employer's
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not
94
necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason... is correct.""t
Therefore, these cases arguably support the conclusion that the jury instructions
should focus on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination and should
not necessarily direct the jury's attention to the question of whether or not the
employer has told the truth.'
Instead, the veracity of the defendant's
explanation should merely play a role, albeit often 96a primary role, in
determining the existence of intentional discrimination.
Moreover, both Hicks and Reeves indicate the importance of not providing
special treatment to cases involving the McDonnell Douglas framework as
opposed to other types of civil litigation. In Hicks, the Court noted that "the
McDonnellDouglas methodology was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized,
or ritualistic."" 97 Justice Scalia concluded the majority opinion with the
following language:
[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive
and difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
cases).
192.

See generallyReeves, 530 U.S. 133; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).
193.

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981)).
194. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524) (emphasis added).
195. See Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786,789 (8th Cir. 2001) (reasoning
that the trial court presented the "proper legal standard" to the jury in submitting an instruction
on the ultimate question of discrimination without including an instruction on pretext).
196. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) ("In
appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose."). The Court
added: "Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may
well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best
position to put forth the actual reason for its decision." Id.
197. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))).
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Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. There will seldom
be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But none
of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat
discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact. 198
The Court quoted approvingly from this passage in the Reeves opinion as
well. 99 To some degree, this language seems at odds with the elaborate
measures taken by the Court to establish pretext as the cornerstone of
employment discrimination litigation.'0°
Nevertheless, if discrimination
litigation merits no special treatment, one could reasonably conclude that
instructions on pretext, like other permissible inferences in civil litigation,
properly fall within the discretion of the trial court.'
Mandatory use of the
pretext instruction certainly constitutes special treatment.
Finally, the Court's brief look at the jury instructions in Reeves is
noteworthy.20 2 In this case the jury found for the plaintiff without receiving
clear instructions on the permissible inference of pretext. 20 3 Nevertheless, the
Court mentioned the trial court's jury instructions with seeming approval in the
following discussion:
The District Court plainly informed the jury that petitioner was required to
show "by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining
and motivating factor in the decision of [respondent] to terminate him."
The court instructed the jury that, to show that respondent's explanation
was a pretext for discrimination, petitioner had to demonstrate "1,that the
stated reasons were not the real reasons for [petitioner's] discharge; and 2,
that age discrimination was the real reason for [petitioner's] discharge. ' ,2°,
While the Court did not provide an in-depth analysis of this instruction,
and therefore this passage should not receive undue emphasis, it seems relevant
for two primary reasons. First, steps one and two of this instruction are
reminiscent of the erroneous pretext-plus standard explicitly discarded in
198. See id. at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716).
199. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 ("[W]e have reiterated that trial courts should not 'treat
discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact."' (quoting St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716))).
200. See id. at 147 (discussing the role of pretext as perhaps the most persuasive form of

circumstantial evidence in an employment discrimination dispute).
201. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
desirability of leaving descriptions of pretext to the argument of counsel rather than including
those descriptions in jury instructions).
202. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153-54 (2000)
(discussing jury instructions given at trial).
203. See id. at 139 (discussing the jury verdict for plaintiff at trial).
204. Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
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Reeves itself and certainly do not approach the specificity of the pretext
instruction required in the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits. 2 5 Second, based
on this instruction, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 0 6 That fact
alone leads into a critique of the second part of the argument for mandating use
of the pretext instruction.
Of the three circuits that have required the pretext instruction, the two
most recent opinions, from the Third and the Tenth Circuits, have relied heavily
on the assumption that, without the instruction, a jury might never realize the
legal possibility of inferring discrimination from pretext. 20 7 The Third Circuit
garnered support for this belief from the difficulties experienced by federal
courts in addressing this very issue:
In light of the decades it has taken for the courts to shape and refine the
McDonnell Douglas standard into its present form and the inordinate
amount of ink that has been spilled over the question of how a jury may use
its finding of pretext, it would be disingenuous to argue that it is nothing
more than a matter of common sense. Indeed, the answer to the question of
whether a jury is allowed to infer discrimination from pretext eluded many
of the federal courts of this country for a substantial period of time.20 8
The Tenth Circuit relied upon similar logic in emphasizing the risk
that the jury "might make the same assumption that the Fifth Circuit did in
Reeves" unless the jury receives an instruction on pretext. 20 9 Judge Henry,
who concurred in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Townsend, emphasized the
same conclusion. 210 He reasoned that if a juror had concluded the plaintiff
could not prevail without satisfying a pretext-plus standard, "that juror
would stand in lofty--or at least legal-company: until quite recently,
205. Compare Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47 (discussing the erroneous belief that a plaintiff
must adduce evidence in addition to pretext in order to prevail) with Townsend v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that "a trial court must instruct
jurors that if they disbelieve an employer's proffered explanation they may-but need notinfer that the employer's true motive was discriminatory").
206. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 139 (discussing jury verdict for the plaintiff at trial).
207. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241 (discussing the danger that ajury might believe that
"the plaintiff could not prevail without affirmative evidence" in the absence of a pretext
instruction (quoting Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 172, at 10)); Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280-81 (3d
Cir. 1998) (discussing whether "jurors are smart enough or intuitive enough to realize that
inferences of discrimination" may be drawn from a finding of pretext).
208. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d at 280-81.
209. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241.
210. See id. at 1243-44 (Henry, J., concurring) (discussing the risk that jurors will make
the same mistake of many federal courts and fail to realize the legality of inferring
discrimination from pretext).
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many federal courts had adopted just such an interpretation regarding the
impermissibility of such an inference." 2 11 While this reasoning seems
logical, and undoubtedly comforts the judicial ego, it does not present a
compelling justification for requiring the instruction.2 12
In his dissent to Townsend, Judge Brorby dismissed the reasoning
behind this assumption as unpersuasive: "While the question of how much
weight should be given to evidence of pretext in discrimination cases has
proven thorny for legal professionals, I doubt the jury viewed this case as
anything more than a trial to decide which party was telling the truth." 21 3 It
therefore seems logical that jurors with no knowledge of the complicated
legal history surrounding pretext will focus on credibility without regard to
fine shades of law. This view gains additional credence upon consideration
of arguments of counsel at trial. If the plaintiff's counsel tells the jury,
repeatedly, that the defendant employer has lied to cover up a
discriminatory motive, the jury will certainly understand the importance of
this possible lie. 2 4 After all, the law on pretext has been built on the
"commonsense principle" that evidence of dishonesty often translates into
evidence of liability. 21 5 At the very least, it seems logical to conclude that a
211.

Id. at 1243 (Henry, J., concurring).

212.

See id. at 1247 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (discussing the practical view that jurors

without legal training had most likely viewed the dispute as nothing "more than a trial to decide

which party was telling the truth").
213. Id. (Brorby, J., dissenting). Judge Brorby cited the following language from the
Supreme Court regarding the difference between legal reasoning and common-sense logic:
Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of
meaning in the same way that lawyers might. Differences among them in
interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with

commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken
place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.
Id. (Brorby, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990)).
214. See Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2001)
(discussing the arguments presented by plaintiff's counsel regarding pretext). The Eighth
Circuit stated:

Finally, although the District Court elected not to submit a pretext instruction, it in
no way prevented Moore from presenting his pretext arguments to the jury. In both
opening and closing statements, Moore repeatedly argued to the jury that the
explanations given by the Fire District were a pretext for race discrimination. If the
jury had accepted Moore's pretext arguments it would have been required to find in

his favor under the instructions provided by the District Court. Therefore, even if
there were instructional error, Moore incurred no prejudice.
Id.

215.

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 154 (2000) (Ginsburg,

J., concurring) (discussing a basic principle "of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a

party's dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability").
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trial court's failure to instruct the jury on pretext will not prejudice the
plaintiff as long as plaintiff's counsel receives ample opportunity to argue
the issue.216
In addition, a possible risk of undue emphasis exists if the judge
singles out the pretext instruction to the expense of other permissible
inferences in an employment discrimination dispute.21 7 For example, in
addition to pretext, "a plaintiff may argue that an inference of
discrimination may be drawn from stray remarks in the work place,
disparate treatment of other employees, or statistics on the composition of
the workforce. '21 8 Similarly, "a defendant may argue that an inference of
no discrimination should be drawn from the fact that the decisionmaker is
the same race or sex as the plaintiff, or that the decisionmaker had been 'the
219
one who hired the plaintiff shortly before the adverse action was taken.
Although these inferences probably do not carry as much persuasive
weight as an inference of pretext, 220 they merit consideration nevertheless,
and the trial judge should not shortchange or neglect these other inferences
at the expense of an explicit jury instruction on the permissible inference of
pretext. 221 Jury instructions in employment discrimination cases should
strive for clarity and should focus primarily on the ultimate question of
intentional discrimination.2 22 The trial judge may provide useful guidance
216. See Moore, 249 F.3d at 791 (discussing how the failure to instruct on pretext did not
prejudice the plaintiff because plaintiff's counsel freely argued on pretext throughout the trial);
see also Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Gehring's lawyer asked the
jury to draw this inference; neither judge nor defense counsel so much as hinted that any legal
obstacle stood in the way. Instructions on the topic were unnecessary.").
217. See Bril4 supra note 9, at § 4.27 (discussing several different permissible inferences
found in an average employment discrimination case and the risk of unduly emphasizing the
pretext instruction).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ("Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive." (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 517 (1993)); see also Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,279 (3d Cir. 1998)
(discussing the "pivotal role played by pretext in the ultimate decision of discrimination vel
non").
221. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232,1246 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Brorby, J., dissenting) ("In some instances, a facially neutral permissive inference instruction
might draw unwarranted attention to a small portion of the evidence presented at trial or mislead
the jury as to the applicable law.").
222. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[lt is especially
important to write instructions that are as clear and simple as possible. When the legal issue is
complex, simplicity of language is vital."); see also Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1246 (Brorby, J.,
dissenting) ("Rather than merely restating counsel's argument, jury instructions should be a
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on relevant inferences, but this guidance should not overwhelm otherwise
clear and simple instructions directed towards intentional discrimination.223
While courts cannot forget the complicated legal history surrounding
pretext, jurors lack these unpleasant memories.224 In Hicks and Reeves, the
Supreme Court sought to clarify pretext issues for federal courts, not for
juries. 2 s A jury will likely understand the common sense foundation for
pretext on its own, especially after hearing argument on the issue from the
plaintiff s counsel.226 Absent any truly persuasive reasons for requiring the
pretext instruction, the general premise that a judge need not instruct the
jury on permissible inferences continues to apply.227 Based on this
premise, combined with the potential risk of undue emphasis, this Note
228
favors leaving the decision within the discretion of the trial court.

neutral statement of the law.").
223. See Achor v. Riverside Golf Club, I 17 F.3d 339, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the importance of clear and concrete jury instructions in employment discrimination cases).
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, stated:
A judge might usefully direct the jury's attention to some issues that support an
inference one way or the other, such as whether the managers made remarks
implying antipathy to older workers, or the age of a person's replacement, but
factors that support an inference of discriminatory intent are [not] necessary.
Id. at 341 (citing generally St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
224. See Brill, supra note 9, at § 4.27 ("[l]t is likely that a jury will understand, without
being told by the judge, that if an employer is lying about its real reason for its employment
actions, it may be trying to cover up an unlawful reason, and that unlawful aason may be the
discriminatory reason asserted by the plaintiff.").
225. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000) (addressing
the question of entering judgment as a matter of law in an employment discrimination case);
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504 (addressing the question of the correct role of a finding of pretext in
entering judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff).
226. See Gehring, 43 F.3d at 343 ("Gehring's lawyer asked thejury to draw this inference;
neither judge nor defense counsel so much as hinted that any legal obstacle stood in the way.
Instructions on the topic were unnecessary.").
227. See id. (discussing the desirability of leaving descriptions of permissible inferences to
the argument of counsel).
228. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Brorby, J., dissenting) ("[A] trial court should, after considering counsels' arguments and all
that has taken place at trial, be able to refuse to offer a permissive inference instruction."); see
also Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786,790 (8th Cir. 200 1)("Given the state of
the evidence, which provides little to create a fact issue on pretext, the District Court properly
exercised its discretion in declining to submit a pretext instruction."); Brill, supra note 9, at
§ 4.27 ("A judge need not instruct a jury on something that jurors can glean from everyday
experience and that is likely to be argued by the lawyers.").
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V. Conclusion
Two Supreme Court opinions in the past decade have devoted substantial
analysis to the role of pretext in entering judgment as a matter of law for both
plaintiffs and defendants in employment discrimination litigation. 229 Despite
this extensive analysis, neither case addresses the question of appropriate jury
instructions in these types of cases. 230 Although federal courts have struggled
with the appropriate legal role of pretext, that jurors will experience identical
difficulties does not seem intuitively obvious. 231 Plaintiffs' counsel, as a rule,
harp on the issue for the benefit of juries, and evidence that the employer has
lied should weigh heavily in jury deliberations regardless of the instruction
provided.23 2
In addition, numerous courts have indicated the importance of instructing
the jury simply and clearly in employment discrimination litigation. 233 This
laudable goal easily becomes quite difficult because of the legalistic
terminology of the McDonnell Douglas framework and the variety of possible
permissible inferences surrounding circumstantial evidence in these types of
cases.234 The trial court stands in the best position to evaluate evidence in the
context of legal complexities inherent in employment discrimination litigation
and to provide appropriate jury instructions adapted to the circumstances in

229. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 137 (addressing the question of whether a defendant employer
may receive judgment as a matter of law despite evidence of pretext); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504
(addressing the question of whether a plaintiff must receive judgment as a matter of law upon a
finding of false explanation by a defendant employer).
230. Id.
23 1. Supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
232. See Brill, supranote 9, at § 4.27 (discussing the premise that judges need not instruct
jurors on concepts that jurors have learned through life experiences (citing Gehring v. Case
Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994)).
233. See, e.g., Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340,343-45 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
importance of clear and simple jury instructions in employment discrimination cases); Cabrera
v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 380 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Much of the difficulty in this case arises from
the fact that language used by appellate courts to formulate burdens of proof and production in
the context of bench trials has been imported uncritically into jury charges.").
234. See Brill, supra note 9, at § 1.3 ("It is difficult to draft clear and accurate instructions
in discrimination cases."). Judge Brill added:
Through statutory changes and numerous Supreme Court decisions refining the
law, the area has become exceedingly (and unnecessarily) complex .... Because
so much is at stake and the issues are so complex, judges and attorneys must put a
great deal of time and effort into drafting accurate and understandable jury
instructions and verdict forms.
Id. at §§ 1.3-1.5.
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each individual trial.235 While including an instruction on pretext may often
provide helpful legal guidance, and should undoubtedly merit careful
consideration, the prudent and conservative path leads to23 6the conclusion that
this decision falls within the discretion of the trial court.

The ever-increasing volume of employment discrimination cases on the
federal docket and the split among the United States Courts of Appeals
regarding jury instructions on pretext necessitate swift resolution of this issue
by the Supreme Court.2 37 In Hicks and Reeves, the Court firmly established
pretext as a question for the jury.2 38 Now the time has come to establish a clear
standard for instructing juries in employment discrimination litigation. Ideally,
the standard should emphasize the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination while leaving discretion in the hands of the trial judge to mold
instructions to each particular case.239 Simplicity is paramount. Judge
Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Gehring, described the best
approach to formulating jury instructions in employment discrimination cases:
We do not want to tie the judge's hands; language works best if it responds
to the nature of the precise dispute between the parties. But we urge every
district judge to take a red pencil to arcane, cabalistic, inscrutable,
ambiguous, and unnecessary words. The closer the instructions come to the
jurors' everyday
language, the more likely the jurors are to apply them
240
correctly.

235. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1246(10th Cir. 2002)
(Brorby, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of allowing the trial judge to retain discretion
regarding proper formulation of jury instructions); see also Brill, supra note 9, at § 5.1
(describing the necessity of careful consideration of the many issues that must go into jury
instructions in employment discrimination cases). For example, Judge Brill expressed the
possibility of giving an instruction on pretext to balance a "business judgment" instruction given
on behalf of the defendant. Id. at §§ 4.27-4.32. A business judgment instruction generally
"informs the jury that [the defendant] cannot be found liable for exercising its business
judgment, even if the jury disagrees with the manner in which it did so, as long as its reasons
were not discriminatory." Id. at § 4.29.
236. See Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2001)
(describing the proper exercise of discretion by the trial court in refusing to grant pretext
instruction because of the limited evidence of pretext adduced at trial).
237. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing the enormous volume of
employment discrimination cases on the federal docket and describing the circuit split).
238. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
239. See Townsend, 232 F.3d at 1246 (Brorby, J., dissenting) ("Rather than merely
restating counsel's argument, jury instructions should be a neutral statement of the law ....
Therefore, a trial court should, after considering counsels' arguments and all that has taken
place at trial, be able to refuse to offer a permissive inference instruction.").
240.

Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir. 1994).

